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I
Comparing is a means toward understanding. This being so, we may expect to
enhance a proper assessment of administrative regulation by looking at the record of
foreign experience. Perhaps there are lessons that deserve consideration-or cautions,
or hints. Even a dull tracing of parallels may help to clarify trends and tendencies.
For obvious reasons, however, comparison is most fruitful when its object does
not change from place to place. To a rider, the care of his horse is likely to be of
considerable concern. But he would not get much enlightenment from inquiring
into the treatment of man's mount elsewhere if man's mount elsewhere happened
to be an elephant, or a camel, or a burro. In its most precise meaning, perhaps, administrative regulation as talked about in the United States does pose the same
problem. In certain respects, it is something peculiarly home-grown. It may be too
American for comparative examination to yield a full harvest.
The implications of such doubt are enlarged when one remarkable thing is
borne in mind. It comes to light in the fact that the prevailing mode of reference
in the United States links administrative regulation with the imposition of authority
over economic interests, with the powers of government as they affect business.
Administrative regulation thus is focused primarily on statutory clauses, public
agencies, and official procedures, on the one hand, and on economic practices, on
the other. Surprisingly little attention, by and large, has been given to the social
matrix of administrative regulation, even to its basic ends. The degree to which
administrative regulation is-or ought to be-an expression of government's fundamental concern with order, so as to provide a favorable environment for the unfolding of man's creative resources, is rarely placed under the magnifying glass. Much
less is made of the significance of regulation as the essence of organized group life,
of society itself, separate from government as its policeman, promoter, equalizer,
and repairman.
For these reasons, it is probably useful to begin our brief exploration of comparative perspectives with some reflections on the social roots of regulation. As the
organized state, for all practical purposes, is the bringer as well as the guardian of
law, so is the state the source of formal regulation. But such formal regulation, in
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the last analysis, represents the more or less adept management of society's inherent
regulatory urge. Underneath all regulation is man's elementary need for obtaining,
as a minimum, a suitable balance of advantage and disadvantage from the rewards
and risks of group living.
What is a suitable balance, at least in minimal terms? Who is to be the judge?
Man singly cannot prevail in this allocation of benefits and sacrifices, except as the
tyrant or the demagogue. So he seeks strength, safety, and comfort by getting on
the bandwagon of dominant community mores and sentiments, by accepting the
guidance of the sense that seems common. Such guidance stems in part from individual foresight and group experience, but has other sources as well. It may flow,
in part, from superstitions; or it may have crystallized, in part, in traditions; or it may
be, in part, the output of opinion-manufacture, engaged in by the few to exploit the
many; or it may express, in part, concepts of celestial partisanship to which human

beings must bow reverentially.
These and similar influences spin the fabric of regulation. They furnish answers
about right and wrong. They have produced in the United States that most
extraordinary, well-nigh pornographic body of regulatory provisions aimed at
chaperoning sex-provisions having more rather than less of a bite when made to
snap at victims but highly selectively. The local interplay of these influences explains why there may be a difference of twenty years behind bars depending on
whether seduction is proved in one state of the union or another, as Morris Ernst
once concluded.'
When we turn from society's ceaseless efforts in weaving the web of regulation
to those of government, it becomes clear at once that the most pervasive factor
consists of the close relationships between both areas. But government is a structure
designed to integrate the forces of society, to bring about civic commitments, to
provide the forms available for legitimate public action. In its own structure,
government, therefore, lays out channels of group influence and, consequently,
strategic points of control.
It follows that the representative system, together with its obscure alley-ways,
becomes the terrain in which political field commanders move their troops for closely
calculated victories, often quite independent of what the public wants. The regulatory propensity of society may thus be diverted by an adroit superimposition of
group goals, as in the case of the American Medical Association, to name a single but
striking illustration. In the sphere of governmental activity, much depends on how
articulate groups are, whether they are sufficiently well-off to make themselves heard
widely, and whether the general public has discerning ears. Conversely, much depends on the counterweight of a common rationality, a "public philosophy" in Walter
Lippmann's sense, 2 and the capacity of the party system for evolving programs having
broad appeal.
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From this vantage point, we come to a view of regulatory agencies different in
many respects from that encouraged by prevailing nomenclature. On the primary
level, and putting it quite abstractly, society itself is a regulatory agency of vast
importance. In more concrete manifestation, as something harnessed by human
wills in order to attain specific objectives, regulatory agencies are characterized by a
more sharply delineated focus of interest as well as by greater attention to organizational form.
But these agencies are by no means all governmental. Many are private in nature.
Of these, some attempt a type of self-government of particular occupations. But
one must not overlook the more familiar categories of interest groups, ranging from
churches or patriotic societies to trade associations and labor unions. Such agencies
generate power as a consequence of their very existence and in proportion to their
basic strength. Thus, part of the regulatory capacity of society comes to lodge within
them.
Either as an outcome or as an activity, regulation, therefore, resembles a contest
between sources of influence. Of necessity, the regulated are simultaneously regulators in a real sense, and the center of gravity-or the actual locus of regulatory
power-is shifting in some ways all the time. Expressed differently, to assume that
only public agencies are engaged in administrative regulation is to restrict the field
of vision beyond all reason.
Indeed, for the most part, the failure of public agencies to pursue their regulatory
mandate with sufficient energy can be traced to a latent veto emanating from society
itself. Nominal authority parceled out to governmental agencies is frequently immobilized by conflicting regulatory dispositions embodied in private agencies.
The aims as well as the scope of administrative regulation may thus be said to be
the object of a continuing disputation among the participants of the regulatory
process. Thesis and antithesis seem drawn together in a single corpus, as it were.
By comparison with such a condition of near-equilibrium of public and private
agencies, the regulatory pattern may demonstrate under other conditions the militancy
of a popular movement, of an emotional drive, even of a venerated formula.
Something like this is in evidence in the evolution and the stature of France's
droit administratif. Originally the result of a revolutionary upsurge against the
domination of administrative power by an unsympathetic judiciary, hailed as a liberation of the people's prerogative from its enslavement to the judges, the new administrative law had a populist aura that gave it ideological substance. As a consequence, private as well as public agencies fitted themselves into the magnetic field left
by the French Revolution of 1789. The result has been that droit administratif,despite its aloofness from partisan causes and despite the change in regimes, remained
all along on speaking terms with the common man. For its extensive area, administrative law reflected an unchallengeable settlement in the war of purposes, public
and private, an element of the active constitution. It maximized the guidance
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needed by public agencies and minimized the interposing power of private agencies.
In short, it served as a source of effective social discipline.
But France is here no more than a respected voice in a continental European
chorus. No less pertinent are the comparable institutions of other countries,
including the German example, built about the Rechtsstaat idea as the most
tangible safeguard of legality for the "ordinary man" when he felt the grip of administrative power. There may be little in this concept that is not equally implicit
in the Anglo-American version of the "rule of law." The difference in the practical
significance of the two lies in the impact upon administrative regulation. In a
nutshell, with us, a Hewart of Bury' or a Roscoe Pound, 4 with bravoes from the
legal profession, might step forth to exorcise the demons of bureaucratic arrogance.
In Germany, the Rechtsstaat idea became a powerful factor in the orientation of the
bureaucracy itself, a binding standard of lawful action and concern with right
germane to the outlook of a self-conscious middle class.
II
We reminded ourselves of the regulatory urge that rises within society from
its very nature in order to stress the derivative character of governmental regulation.
Without the first, the second would lack foundation. Society produces the sound,
so to speak, and government the echo. But such a statement requires qualification
to match the facts without distortion. Being organized rather than organic, being
established rather than grown, government serves as a man-made instrument of
purpose. If society is what's in the kettle, government is the spout, together with
the hand that does the pouring. Unfortunately for competent pouring, however,
the spout may be split as well as full of holes; and instead of one hand, there may
be haphazard grappling of many.
Measured by the equivalent of splits and holes and hands, then, the operational
effectiveness of government can be appraised over a hypothetical range ascending
from bottom to top. As an active force, government-or the state, to use once more
the classical language of political theory-is not a constant, but a variable, which,
in turn, is profoundly affected by other variables, political, economic, and social.
Granting that much, it is self-evident that the same must be true of regulation.
Whatever the legal prescription for the mechanics of the regulatory process, of
critical significance for the character of its performance is its general environment,
the "parallelogram of forces" about it.
Ultimately, of course, regulation is to provide the signposts of human behavior.
But the purpose may be defeated when there are too few or too many such posts;
or when it becomes a national sport to push them over; or when they are habitually
ignored, though kept in place, as if for decoration. The attitude of most Americans
toward the Eighteenth Amendment at the height of the campaign against honest
liquor is a case in point.
3
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Complete defeat of regulatory purpose is relatively rare under normal conditions
of government in the contemporary western style. But there is much ground to
traverse between such defeat and the often naively assertive language of administrative regulation. Between these two poles, one encounters the evidence of relative
success that may be claimed for different regulatory patterns. Here, then, are found
the telling differences of degree-distinctions that run far less frequently to white and
black than to varying shades of grey. In spotting these differences, we are bound to
deal, time and again, with a considerable array of variables. Indeed, each characteristic of a given regulatory prototype continuously evolves its variants in terms of more
or less.
The civic acceptance and thus the basic efficacy of administrative regulation are
linked in a primary way with several factors. One worth mentioning first is the
degree to which the public at large is inclined to identify itself with government,
as the agency of the common good. That is partly a matter of constitutional arrangements for political participation of the citizenry in the determination of general
policy. Partly it has to do with the relative standing of private enterprise and
public enterprise in the forum of mass opinion. And partly it is the result of the
institutional resources commanded by government, of its capacity for accomplishing
what it sets out to do, of the intellectual equipment of its public service.
In such combination of ingredients, a country like Sweden, for instance, would
rate toward the top. She has long enjoyed an easier synthesis in her national life
than would have been conceivable in the United States, granting its historic evolution, especially during the nineteenth century. It is, therefore, not surprising that
Swedish administrative law, despite the essential simplicity of its conceptual structure,
reflects a high degree of social consciousness and sophistication-qualities that have
often been stressed by as great an authority as Professor Herlitz.5
Another factor relevant to our discussion is the degree to which government
succeeds in unifying the pluralistic drives and tensions of society. To acknowledge
this aim is not to deny the essentially plural nature of any aggregation of human
beings, each sewn into his skin, each lastly the captive of his self. Man may seek to
tranquilize himself under layers of woolly "togetherness," but will yet continue to
turn into an obstreperous nuisance in the most elementary group processes when
his changing moods so prompt him and his restraints give way. However, by
accepting the fact that society is plural of necessity, we merely emphasize the correlating task of government. The many must manage to be one, for certain
purposes and on certain occasions; and to do that, they must work toward being
one by learning to move in formations. When government does not rise above
the diversity of society, it sacrifices its organizing purpose. It fails to furnish common denominators for social advance as well as for order and freedom. It leaves
the cooperative energies of society without a formula to provide direction.
'See,
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Here, again, the variables of more or less are in evidence. The pluralism of
interests may largely remain unmitigated for want of a party system strong enough
to become the taskmaster of utilitarian union. If there is such a party system, it is
likely to force the interests into coalitions and alliances that in themselves amount
to a first-level coordinating effort. Party programs push what is special toward an
acknowledgment of what is joint and even what is general, at least within the
kinship order that connects compatible special interests, whether one thinks of the
economic, the social, or the broadly cultural realm.
When party programs serve to bring and hold together certain interest groupings,
when each comes to respect a common bond uniting it with certain others if only
pragmatically, the program of a party is bound to follow it into the driver's seat.
Party programs, in so far as they signify a coalescence of kindred interests around
mutually desirable political objectives, are fit to be converted into governmental
programs when the party is carried into power. Programs that convey marching
orders for political action are like current running through the entire structure of
government. One dominant impulse simultaneously actuates both legislation and
administration. Then the approach of a particular regulatory agency cannot be
expected to be self-centered and insular. On the contrary, it will operate in the
stream of government-wide responsibility, be, therefore, more visible to the public
eye, and consequently itself gain in sense of responsibility.
When painting with a broad brush, one has to sacrifice, to some extent, the
finer shadings. Contrasts are often sharpened beyond the point of impeccable
accuracy. It is, therefore, well to remember that in the process of comparison, we
are substituting repeatedly rough approximations of reality for the precise verification of each factual component. But such approximations are quite satisfactory for
our present purposes. Even when one talks in approximations, it is easy to recognize
the validity of contrasting an institutionally unified political system, relatively
speaking, with one that generates divisive forces by its own design, again relatively
speaking.
The United States belongs in the second category. The Founding Fathers proved
unwilling to plan either for themselves or for those groups closest to them a role of
assured elitarian domination. They planned instead against domination itself.
Federalism, the separation of powers, the dual structure of the legislature, the opportunity for judicial challenge of every type of authority-all these militate against
an easy attainment of the integrating function of government. None of the instrumentalities of division has merely negative implications. Each has contributed
values that have been entered on the ledger of American growth. But there is no
question that, precisely for the same reason, the United States has periodically been
agitated by the impatient quest for a true pattern of public responsibility. At
progressively shorter intervals, the same battle cry was heard. There was to be an
end to the fragmentation of power, to the escape from answerability, to the reckless
scattering of government's precious capacity for action in the general interest.
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For a long time, America's political image-to use a term lately touched by too
many unwashed hands-was overwhelmingly custodial. It was centered on the
preservation of "soundness" as the "consensus" of a raw, yet creative enterprise
society. Such preservation did not require strong arms. Rather, it was to be accomplished by the massive weight of an acquiescing attitude. In these circumstances,
the outline of public responsibility could well stay blurred. When it comes to
deploying the forces of government for action, for the achievement of objectives given
priority by being part of a program, responsibility must be poised in an ascending
order, as a rationally intelligible structure. When the pressure of weight suffices,
responsibility can afford to be diffuse-if it is still properly called responsibility.
As long as the custodial function of government was dominant, and as long as
the "consensus" of society, in turn, dominated that function, the specific operations
of public agencies did not matter greatly. For the most part, they could be left to
political patronage. A new class of middlemen had come forth. Although habitually
derided as "politicians," they had one redeeming grace. No one could blame
them for being in the middleman's business for the sake of business. But they
could be trusted, by and large, to respond instinctively to "soundness," to the "consensus" of society, especially to the property symbolism. There was nothing decadent
about it. When Lincoln Steffens pitted his moral determination against the
"bosses," he could not fail to discover at last that he was confronting the vitality of
Henry Clay's "American System" '
Small wonder that the reform movement in the early decades of our century
preached concentration of responsibility, together with a professionalization of the
public service. If these had not been goals in conflict with the buccaneering habits
of party machines, the American people might have been spared the high-class
passion for "nonpartisan" partisanship. As it was, such leaders as Charles E. Hughes,
Elihu Root, and Henry L. Stimson, each uncommitted to a party gospel, had to make
their own way in battling against the old political order They addressed themselves to reshaping the "consensus" of society, without attempting to blow new life
into the limp body of the party system.
What has emerged from the reform movement is difficult to overestimate.
Broadly speaking, it is the gradual fashioning of the essential equipment for reasonably effective government in the United States in the face of twentieth-century
needs. The markstones stand out in time, slow as the development might seem to
the impatient. 19o6 saw the beginnings of the New York Bureau of Municipal
Research, the first significant venture in cooperation between public-spirited business
captains and the new professionals in administrative analysis.' In 1917, the state
'See LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE STRUGLE FOR SELF-GOVERN EfNT (1906).
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of Illinois brought the critically important function of budgetary planning and
fund control directly under the governor, as a "strong executive." Four years later,
in 1921, Congress passed in virtual unanimity a piece of legislation that aimed in
the same direction, but actually reached out much farther. It managed to hide
its quasi-constitutional impact behind the opaque designation of Budget and
Accounting Act.
The Act did set up badly needed fiscal machinery for estimates review, expenditure control, and independent audit. Much more far-reaching, however, were four
other features of the law. In the first place, responsibility for providing Congress
through the annual budget with a comprehensive and integrated plan of operations
for the federal government was squarely put upon the President. But this time
a solemn invocation did not seem enough. Words had failed in earlier laws to
prompt deeds. The Act, secondly, took care of this difficulty by placing at the
President's elbow a thing stuffed with potentialities, something that in any such
explicit form had not existed before. The new thing was a staff agency, the Bureau
of the Budget, exclusively under the President's command, to help him with the
chores of his office, in the wider executive as well as in the budgetary spheres. The
position of Budget Director was so designed in law as to make him in every
sense "the President's man," leader of a continuing professional staff, a presidential
fact-finder who would furnish direction over this staff from the angle of the
President.
Thirdly, the Budget and Accounting Act made it expressly a duty of the new
bureau to engage in management analysis and to conduct administrative studies in
particular federal agencies. This was more than a matter of ampler jurisdiction.
Rather, by doing so, the Act caused the budget agency to lift its eyes above accounting
sheets, toward the functioning of the apparatus available for accomplishing the
President's program and toward the problems to be solved as well. And lastly, the
Act provided a foundation for turning the Budget Bureau at the same time into the
President's clearing house for legislation. In reviewing legislative proposals, session
upon session, the Bureau again was encouraged to temper the negative predisposition
of a financial watchdog with careful consideration of the legislative means for
carrying forward the President's policies. The Budget Bureau's responsibility was as
much oriented toward getting things done as it had to do with control over spending.
III
Why these observations about administrative growth? Simply to make very
clear that Government in the United States has radically changed its operating style
"Every public administrative centre should have a fact centre." WsLLzaf H. ALLEN, EFFICIENT DaMoCtACY 261 (1907).
The ideal of "efficiency" was captivating at that time not only the world of
business, but also other realms. Thus, Professor William H. Allison declared: "The essential apostolic
qualification in American Baptist polity has been efficiency." Allison, The Basis ol Baptist Polity,
[Baptist) Standard, March 30, 1907, p. 923. See also SHAILER MATHEWS, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN
THE CHURCHES (1912).
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since the Interstate Commerce Commission struggled through its first day of business
in 1887. It is in our own century that the Presidency has come to the fore as a unique
institution of governmental cohesion and program coordination, besides revealing
itself as a vast repository of political strength. It is in our own century that American public administration has assumed truly professional characteristics, in both
day-by-day competence and intellectual resources employed for policy planning. It
is in our own century that the staff organization available to the President himself
has attained a high degree of institutional maturity. Past and present are set apart.
It is for these reasons that the view of American government and administration
that is still prevalent in so many places abroad is hopelessly outdated.
Although it is hard to say how America sees itself today in the governmental
dimension, one thing is quite certain. The administrative realities of the midtwentieth century leave little of the incoherent theory that nurtured the nineteenthcentury American approach to administrative regulation. Above all, the promise of
impregnability against partisan inroads, assurance of expertship, and institutional
autonomy that was advanced by the concept of the so-called independent regulatory
commission would not survive immediate challenge if it were to come up in our
day as a fresh idea. Indeed, to put it bluntly, were it conceivable that the regulatory
pattern in the United States had yet to be made at this hour, free from the burden
of what has become distressingly familiar from the past, a groping for solutions
on the model of such commissions or boards would seem highly unlikely.
However invigorating the Jacksonian movement had been as a breakthrough of
popular rule, the deterioration of government's administrative performance that
accompanied it proved to be an enormous liability. The pervasive consequences of
political patronage as a common means of filling political offices made administrative
agencies ineffectual rather than responsive to the people's will. The decades after
the Civil War showed federal administration in a condition of ineptness and
lethargy. If one had to live with the still debatable idea that interstate rail transport
needed the federal government's attention, something more seemed necessary than
the unenlightened ways of a patronage bureaucracy. From this vantage point, it was
realistic to look for a new mechanism equal to the large task to be attempted.
In the circumstances, then, it was not illogical to assume that regulation of a
sensitive sector of the economy called for a special instrument. Partisanship in the
spoils tradition would not do. Nor would ignorance and bungling on the part of
unskilled officials. Neither did it appear tolerable at the opening of the regulatory
era to expose the ministrations of the expert's hand to the dangerous contagion of
loose-jointed administrative practice in the central departments, on the one hand, or
to the manipulative grip of the President as chief executive, on the other. The
independent regulatory commission, if implanted in the no-man's-land between
legislation, administration, and justice, promised to be exactly the right answer
to these specifications.
But change in later decades has been sweeping. With the Presidency as the main-
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spring of administrative energy in the national government and with the federal
service a career establishment of recognized attainments and still greater potentialities, the independent regulatory commission is now becoming a museum exhibit.

Politically, it has shown itself an easy touch for greedy fingers, largely because of
the ambiguities that surround its purpose as well as its status. The isolation of its
existence, away from the general concerns of the executive branch, makes it timid,
stodgy, and slow. The discipline of commitment to a government-wide program is
lacking, and with it a sense of common urgency. Moreover, collegial management,
despite some recent strengthening of the chairman's arm, has continued to be mostly
a burden on good administration.
This is not the place to enter into a detailed examination of what ails the independent regulatory commission. What is important is to bear in mind that the
pattern of administrative regulation in the United States evolved from the deficiencies
in the general style of departmental operations. Conversely, the changed character of
administrative performance cannot be left aside. In the day of the "service state,"
government is reduced to a rather limited choice. It can either develop within its
own cadres the resources needed for effective administrative regulation, or it must
allow those to be regulated to settle down on its back.
These considerations are reinforced by a look at other administrative systems,
especially those that matured at an earlier date. In France, in Brandenburg-Prussia,
and even in England, the adaptation of governmental processes to the evolving
requirements of an economy acquiring urban-commercial characteristics occurred
under auspices of monarchical power, in the shadow of the rising nation-state. Its
backbone was an integrated order of offices, especially on the European continent.
A single administrative apparatus was built up, as the unifying instrument of the
crown. It was manned by "king's men," chosen for competence as well as loyalty,
a novel standing army pledged to serving the new state-the forerunner of today's
merit bureaucracy. Thus, government staked out its managerial claims. The
eighteenth century witnessed the consolidation of effective administration in Prussia
and Austria. Shortly afterward, the Napoleonic era carried France toward the
same goal. And England followed suit in the midnineteenth century, by laying the
foundation for the modern British civil service-so long a gleam in the eye of
American spokesmen of reform.
As administrative regulation in Europe geared itself for the pressures of the
industrial age, it represented a pretested pattern. A search for expertise combined
with institutional staying power was bound to lead back to the normal working
methods of the public service. The writings of administrators around the turn
of the eighteenth century, for the most part distinguished by both an eminently
practical approach and a philosophical disposition, attest the degree to which competence in thought and action had come to lodge in administrative offices. The essential
unity of the departmental system was becoming a continuing concern of the
emerging career service. At the same time, professionalized administration grew
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conscious of its assets. It saw itself-and was generally respected by the public-as

a body knowledgeable in the ways of achieving policy goals by organizational as
well as procedural means; divorced from the interests that wrestled with one another
for influence and accommodation; and able to stand its ground in the storms of
politics.
The administrative systems of Europe, especially those of the continent, achieved
a respectable degree of effectiveness before the same condition was attained generally
in the United States. With us, in the 'eighties, to accomplish the application of
expertise in a novel venture such as the regulation of the railroads, it seemed best to
break out of the bounds of the departmental structure. Outside, the air appeared
fresher and cleaner. Outside, there was the chance of an uncontaminated start.
In Europe, by contrast, the regulatory approach was woven into the operational
heritage of government. It was at the very heart of the administrative process.
To insure resourceful regulation meant to rely on the familiar methods of familiar
public agencies, staffed by men trained to administer.
No new device was needed. What was needed-and what unfolded, stage by
stage, during the first half of the nineteenth century-was a fully developed pattern
of redress against administrative determinations. Characteristically, it was a pattern
general in scope rather than confined to particular governmental functions. It was
informal, rather than weighted down with procedural ritual. It operated in a manner
informed rather than legalistic. And its benefits remained within the reach of the
ordinary mortal's pocket, rather than being accessible only to those who need not
limit their interest in relief from unwarranted impositions because of economic
pressure to avoid considerable costs.
Thus, the problems of administrative regulation were seen abroad mainly as
problems of public accountability. They were not seen primarily as problems
of organizational structure or agency procedure. The emphasis was on the general
law of administration as a source of authority, and as a limitation of authority as
well. But law amounts to little when it sleeps in peace. It needs to speak.
Administrative law called necessarily for a spokesman. This spokesman entered
upon the scene in the form of a specialized judiciary, of judicial bodies distinguished
by thorough knowledge of the practical business of public administration.
It is difficult to imagine how the concept of a separate judiciary for disposing of
citizens' suits against administrative agencies could have made much headway except
for one critically important factor. That factor was the commitment of the ascending merit bureaucracy to the ideal of law and order, and thus to the ideal of limited
authority. To say that this is an ideal peculiarly congenial to maturing merit
bureaucracies is not to detract from the achievement. In a relatively primitive condition, bureaucratic elites are prone to view the free sway of administrative authority
as the very foundation of law and order-and hence as its equivalent, even its essence.
As their sophistication increases, and as the simplified formula of an earlier day has
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to be abandoned, they tend next to fall into escapist habits. The judicial test is too
icy a shower, if it is not being dreaded as the fire of the purgatory itself.
This is an attitude typical of administrative systems that suffer from paucity of
public esteem and, therefore, lack self-confidence. Fritz Fleiner, the great teacher
of administrative law famed for his Institutionen, ° used to pour scorn on the reluctance shown by the Swiss civil service toward entering fully into the spirit of
legal redress, even though the Free Confederacy can hardly be said to furnish a
climate favorable to an authoritarian disposition. Similarly, the career man in
Washington, more often than not, counts it as a victory when a judicial test of administrative power can be avoided. We need to add, perhaps, that the judgment
of a court of law, to him, may seem vastly less predictable than the agreements
coming forth from even an obscure alignment of forces in a congressional committee.
Droit administratif and its genuine counterparts elsewhere in the world reflect
a higher stage of growth in the evolution of the merit bureaucracy. The administrative profession, in this stage, is ready to accept the idea of a legitimate grievance
on the part of the individual. It undertakes to invite the actio popularis as a
beneficial rod, to bow to the need for a legal defense in justification of its deeds,
and to permit a free probing of the supporting arguments. Not surprisingly, this
bent of mind was bound to produce a quasi-proprietary attitude toward administrative law within the career cadre. It was now a matter of honor, so to speak, to
stay on the side of legality, even in the face of strong temptation to laugh off the
judicial test. Dedication to the umpire's integrity of administrative law thus became
the hallmark of the tried-and-true career man in public service.
These factors explain very largely why in France, in Germany, in Austria, and
in other parts of continental Europe, it was the higher civil service that regarded
itself as the pillar of administrative law. The elaboration of both the individual's
sphere of guarded privacy and the governmental agency's range of authority could
not have been accomplished as something external to the public service-and laid
upon it like a yoke. Professional concern with the limits of administrative power
and the extent of the citizen's rights transformed itself into an aspect of the official
milieu. By becoming part of the bureaucratic culture, drot administratif and
Verwaltungsrecht turned into a counterbureaucratic force, keeping the officialdom
within the orbit of a common law that showed marked equalitarian tendencies and
a sturdy sense of balance.
Other influences helped to amplify this general effect. One was the emphasis
on legal knowledge in the academic preparation for the administrative career,
though frequently a target for critics favoring, instead, a managerial orientation.
Administrative law, in turn, rose to a higher and to a more compelling position in
the general course of study required of every one for admission to the bar. Again,
the higher civil service came to regard the law of administration as a branch of legal
'oFRITZ
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knowledge specifically entrusted to its attention. It was not a matter of tolerable
responsiveness to the need for legal counsel once the intrusion of such need into the
busy day could no longer be ignored. Rather, the vital precepts of administrative
law were absorbed into the thinking as well as the language of the merit bureaucracy
itself. Indeed, they turned into a sort of password that made it easy to spot the truly
professional man in administrative office.
As a result, the civilizing pressure of administrative law not only transformed raw
bureaucratic power into an accountable agency of the community, but also penetrated
equally into all of the continuing functions of government. Law and administration came to form a unity. Administrative law merged into the administrative way.
This, once more, could hardly have happened if the arm of the law had reached into
the utilitarian management of public affairs from the outside, like a cold pike.
Happily, the organs of administrative justice, though independent of executive command, were drawing much of their judicial manpower from the ranks of the
higher career service.
Administrative courts, for this reason alone, were well equipped for their role.
They were arsenals of first-hand knowledge about administration. Such knowledge
enabled them, in building up the case law of public management, to do two things
simultaneously. One was the alert handling of issues where the individual needed
protection but where the pursuit of the common good was not to be blocked categorically. Here the art of sure-handed reconciliation of seeming opposites was at a
premium. The other-far more consequential for the entire development-was the
prudent practice of supererogation in the theological sense, by molding constructive
guidelines for use by the administrative profession in serving the public interest.
After all, it was not a simple matter of slapping the hand of the public agency. It
was the task of leading it toward that eminently practical goal-a synthesis of utility
and legality, of public purpose and limited authority.
Any one could stop the show. But the show must go on-in government, too.
What is required, in addition, is that it be a clean professional performance, joining
together, within the bounds of legitimate concepts of feasibility, the proper interest of
the individual and the ultimately overriding interest of the whole body politic.

IV
In the light of the continental European evolution of governmental institutions,
it would seem odd to consider administrative regulation a thing distinguishable from
the larger realm of public management. It would seem odder still to give the conduct
of regulatory functions distinctive organizational form and to farm out the individual regulatory tasks to self-contained agencies insulated from the departmental
system and thus off the highway of executive responsibility. If one were to probe
these reactions in search of explanation, the answer likeliest to come forth would
be the question: Can one conceive of a relevant difference between regulation and
the normal work of administrative agencies?
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In exploring the nature of the judicial process, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo found
it appropriate to begin by asking himself: What is it that I do when I judge?"1
In its flowering, the school of juridical realism in the United States drew much inspiration from operational perspectives like this. But Cardozo was far from presenting a particular school of legal theory, least that of the realists, who looked for the
conceptual essence of law in the behavior of human beings who said that they
applied the law. Even so, Cardozo saw good reason to illuminate the judicial function by an examination of what was being done about it in the course of its exercise.
What do we discover when we adopt the same point of view toward administrative
regulation?
Part of the answer has been given earlier. That answer was to say that to
govern is to regulate. But a complete answer carries us farther. A complete answer
might begin with the observation that to regulate is, in the first place, to scrutinize
meanings. Practically speaking, all administrative regulation functions under the
explicit or implicit direction of certain canons, criteria, standards, or policies. This,
indeed, is true even as we ascend the steps of authority. Legislatures, far from
being freely creative makers of regulatory pronouncements, are under comparable
direction-by ideology, public expectancies, constitutional clauses, and the like.
Constitutions, in turn, as they meet man's dreams, are bound to borrow from the
sacred words of the particular age and often respond to the persistent whisper of
ageless influences such as natural law-a great institution, though neither law, strictly
speaking, nor in any way related to nature.
The problem of meanings is vital on all these different levels of authority. This
is so because dispositional action-action affecting either the public at large or certain
limited publics-is characteristically built on derived competence, on jurisdiction
as well as functions circumscribed in language binding to the regulatory agency.
What it has got to act with is passed down from farther up. To find out what it is
requires reference to meanings employed at a higher point.
This consideration by itself does away with the idea that to regulate is to do as
one pleases. To be sure, when power is forced into a structure of control, excessive
and destructive tightness would develop, save for the immensely beneficial lubricant
known as discretion. Generality and specificity, rule and case, must be brought
together in a nexus both logical and satisfying in terms of the interests to be served.
Here justice cannot afford to be blind. It must be seeing. Discretion is needed
to fashion this nexus by working as the eye of justice.
To express it differently, discretion cannot be divorced from its purpose. It is
not a three-hour pass to get away from the rule. It is, rather, the flying squad for
the rule, to make its presence uniformly felt. Discretion, then, is the means of
assuring that no case is dealt with except in relation to the rule, whatever the particular circumstances; and that such particular circumstances do find proper attention
when otherwise the rule would turn into a mindless tyrant. That is why con" Se BENYUN N. CAR~ozo, Tih
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tinental European administrative law has given so much attention to defining the
limits of lawful discretion, however "free," and to refining the test of motive as a
principal instrument for dividing right from wrong.' 2
Administrative regulation aims at certain results. It seeks to create an insti-

tutional product, so to speak-that is, a specified behavior on the part of those being
regulated, subject to enforceable public accountability. The primary method in turning out the institutional product of regulation is to haul in the pertinent facts, to
analyze and evaluate them, to establish causal relationships as well as the means-end
sequences, to spot alternatives of approach-all so as to do promptly and properly
what needs to be done, under the agency's mandate. The emphasis is on doing,
with the sheltering as well as restraining implication that what is proposed to be done
can be justified.
But the business of regulation is not consummated in the act of justification.
The latter is inferential to the former, and the lawyer gets into the act only in this
inferential context, unless he contributes his skill to devising a sound regulatory
line of action. Certainly, in many instances, the adequacy of empirical research on
which the eventual decision comes to rest will be more significant for the outcome
than purely legal considerations. This fundamental point, it will be recalled,
eventually occurred some fifty years ago even to the very obdurate Professor Dicey,
3
despite his profound misgivings about a thing as un-British as droit administratif.'
What is still more important is that in looking at the methods employed by
administrative regulation, we found nothing that could be called exclusive characteristics. Notice of intent and provision for hearing are auxiliary to arriving at a
finding. It is the finding that is indispensable. In short, we have come to grips
with the essence of the working approach of administration generally, rather than
with a specific regulatory procedure, applicable here but nowhere else. In digging
up the facts and reaching conclusions in the light of the empirical evidence, regulation does not do anything unfamiliar as part of the normal ways of administration.
Nor can one discern any basic distinction in this respect between the fixing of railroad
rates and the licensing of atomic reactors, between policing the security market and
redressing the balance of payments, between allocating wave lengths and fighting
an epidemic, between enforcing requirements of industrial safety and reducing crop
surpluses.
In each of these examples, the first step is the accumulation of concrete information, so as to substitute light for obscurity. Next, the picture thus gained must be
stripped of controversial features as far as possible. In allowing those being regulated
the opportunity of an early challenge, before the last word is said, a useful corrective
"2On the limits of lawful discretion, as they have evolved in continental European administrative law,
see Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of Discretion, 87 U. PA. L. Rav.
954 (1939), Comparative Administrative Law: Economic Improvisation by Public Authorities, 88 id. at
425 (1940).
1 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION foreword
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is introduced. Finally, reasonable safeguards must be provided to infuse into the
emerging decision a responsible projection of the common good. The regulators are
not meant to be merely negotiators between given interests. The decision is not
meant to be merely an exercise in calculating pressures. The interest called general
is not merely a mathematical function of special interests as they happen to intrude.
That is why the career service needs fortitude as well as perception. But in all of this,
again, we encounter simply an outline of how administration works, irrespective
of its particular tasks, regulatory or other-or how it ought to work.
These, then, are the perspectives typical of the continental European attitude
toward administrative regulation. Concisely put, one may sum it up by saying that
to administer is to regulate. The regulatory approach is seen as implicit in the
accomplishment of administrative purposes. Redress of regulatory impositions is,
therefore, regarded as an incidental aspect in the use of general remedies against
unlawful exercise of administrative power. The effectiveness of such remedies had
to be assessed over the entire range of administrative functions and in regard to
all forms of administrative actions, including those of a regulatory character.
In its most significant expression, pursuit of these generally available remedies, as
mentioned earlier, placed the citizen in the care of a specialized judiciary-the administrative courts. As further pointed out before, the administrative courts viewed
themselves as being entrusted with a kind of guardianship over both the law of
administration and the conduct of administration according to law. The incisive
and knowledgeable manner in which this guardianship was exercised helps to explain
why, in turn, the internal procedures of administrative agencies came to reflect
marked deference to legal requirements. But the sense of adequacy about the state
of these internal procedures, especially for dealing with informal complaints, did not
lead to a withdrawal into bureaucratic self-sufficiency. It did not dim the recognition that only a system of external review by administrative courts would supply the
necessary capstone. Without an outside monitor, and one prepared to show the way,
attention to legal guaranties might become slack in the activities of administrative
agencies.
In this way, administrative law gained a dual locus. Internal agency procedures
addressed themselves to the need for fairness in dealing with members of the
public as well as for official accountability. In the last analysis, both served the
purpose of keeping the house of administration clean. Appeals were opened up
from the field-office level to the regional center and ultimately to the headquarters
of a department. As a minimum, on complaint, the judgment of the administrative
superior was brought into play. In more elaborate form, examination of the complaint might be a collegial process, perhaps by a three-man body, including representatives of the public, depending on the administrative operations in question.
The pattern was not uniform in every detail. Different departments evolved different
arrangements. But the concept of a remedial apparatus within the four walls of

COMPARATV

PERSPECTV

administration as an essential element in the discharge of governmental functions
was accepted as commonplace.
Manipulation of this apparatus by the aggrieved citizen was made easy. It did
not require adherence to a set procedure, with its pitfalls of technicality. A handwritten note or even an oral explanation was enough. The tendency for the administrative agency to find itself in the right upon internal review was counteracted by
two important factors. In the first place, the complaint was potentially but the
prelude to external reconsideration before the administrative courts, as the next
stage. Internal review was, therefore, itself always on trial, as it might have to meet
judicial eyes afterward. And secondly, the professional point of view of the administrative cadre translated itself into concern with the efficacy of the department's
mode of operations. Complaints were an incentive toward testing once more the
bolts and screws so vital for good administrative performance.
Administrative justice, as the sphere of the specialized judiciary, and attention to
lawful and responsive procedure within the individual governmental agency, as part
of the regular business of public administration, thus represented two different
realms. But neither made the other superfluous. Each had its well-defined purpose.
To keep the utilitarian drives generated in administrative agencies firmly in
harness, to hold authority within the limits drawn by law, to combat bureaucratic
indifference as well as abuse-these were goals that had to be achieved, in the first
instance, in the day-by-day operations of thousands of public offices. Yet, it was
not enough to acknowledge the conviction that a decent effort was made in most of
these offices to practice the maxim of government of laws. Administrative procedure was always in danger of relaxing into an ex parte parody of equity.
Someone was needed to look in from the outside--one having the right to ask all
kinds of questions, to examine all kinds of files, to weigh all kinds of explanations
in complete independence from executive or legislative influence.
Separate-and separately necessary-as these two realms continued to be, they
were joined by being proving grounds of a single organizing force, the indivisible
body of administrative law. Moreover, the connections were reinforced by the
human factor. The agency spokesman, for example, might be a more widely renowned authority on certain aspects of administrative law than any member of the
panel of judges sitting in a particular case. Again, before being very far along in
his career as a higher civil servant, the agency spokesman might be invited to
change places. He might be called upon in the process of advancement to don the
judicial robe for the remainder of his active years, taking his seat on an administrative court.
The two realms, then, were separate without lacking connections. Indeed, each
existed for the other, in a sense. External review through administrative courts
bolstered the legal instinct of public management. Conversely, the axiom that administration acquired its status as a civilized activity by proceeding on the path of
law tremendously eased the tasks of the administrative courts. Instead of carrying
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the whole load, they could afford a selective approach, centered on the building of
precedents.
V
Like any body of law, administrative law is not safe from the threat of turning
dry and falling dead. Why did continental European administrative law retain its
lan vital for so long? Why did it continue to furnish administrative regulation
a solid foundation even though over the last hundred years the rising industrial
society posed always anew strikingly different problems to cope with and singled out
ever-expanding fields for regulatory action?
Some of the reasons can be recognized without much difficulty. The early
union of function and law, of action and restraint, produced a viable tradition, and
one of great adaptability to the novel demands of the emerging service state. That
the career man in administration usually brought a juridical sensitivity to bear upon
his duties was another factor. That adjudication of conflicts between administrative
agencies and private parties was in the hands of courts that knew the ways of
officialdom was still another. More fundamentally, perhaps, administrative law
gained its social rank by being the pedestal on which the modern merit bureaucracy
assumed its posture as an integral element of the equalitarian constitutional order
of the twentieth century.
One of the outstanding illustrations of a happy combination of these several
4 It is both a central
factors is the French Council of State, the Conseil d'Etat.P
staff agency, especially in advising the cabinet on legislative proposals, and France's
supreme administrative court. In this latter capacity, what is perhaps most remarkable is the deft blending of ingredients of competence as well as of procedure.
On the first, it must be borne in mind that the Council's staff represents one of the
top-ranking grand corps of the French civil service. Competition for entrance has
long been vigorous. In gaining admission, juridical skill and administrative promise
have traditionally been at a premium. It is quite common for the leading spirits in
the Council of State to gain a place among the living authorities on droit administratif-unless they find it more fascinating to write on truly eternal subjects
exemplified by young Leon Blum's Le mariage.
As one of the oddities of the reform measures adopted after World War II, legal
training is now no longer required for entrance. This change was brought on by
the establishment of the National School of Administration. The highest graduates
of the exacting three-year course offered under auspices of the National School are
privileged to knock at the door of the Conseil d'Etat without having delved far into
administrative law. But the Council has quietly overcome this anomaly. In such
case, an unofficial tutorial grooming will be provided by a designated legally trained
"Perhaps the best English introduction into the work of the Conseil d'Etat is C. J. HAMsoN, ExEcuTwE DIsSCRrIoN AND JUDICIAL CONTROL: AN ASPECT OF THE FRENCH CONSEIL D'ETAT (954).
See also
BRIAN CHAPMAN, THE PROFESSION OF GOVERNMENT (1959). For a good concise statement, see Langrod,
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staff member to close the gap. The results thus far, it must be admitted, are quite
impressive.
It is hardly surprising that during the past i6o years the talent available in
the Council has been drawn upon frequently. Staff members have been given a
great variety of special assignments. These have led some into key posts of colonial
administration and into other positions of an executive character. Moreover, members may go on the inactive list and remain there while serving, for instance, as
elected deputies or in international bodies. It may be recalled that President De
Gaulle's durable prime minister, Michel Debre, is a senior staff member of the
Conseil d'Etat.
More frequent are short-term assignments, by official designation. These may
consist of unraveling a difficult administrative situation in or out of Paris, presiding
over eminent-domain proceedings for a controversial public project, carrying on
delicate negotiations involving French interests in some foreign capital, or chairing a
fact-finding body to sift a cluster of unpopular proposals. Much official experience
is thus constantly being carried back into the judicial role of the Council of State.
Equally substantial are the procedural resources of the Conseil d'Etat. In its
inner workings, one observes an intertwining of different mechanisms of scrutiny.
Normally, the weeding out of the governing facts of every case up on appeal is
entrusted to a reporter. It is his task to see to it that at no stage in the disposition
of the case questions of fact arise that cannot be answered on the record he has
assembled. The reporting task is completed with the concise exposition of all that
is factually relevant before the section concerned with the case-a number of individuals sufficiently large to allow for diversity of personalities as well as of points
of view.
The weight of the analytical job of penetrating into the legal issues raised by
the case falls to the governmental commissary. He is normally a tower of juridical
strength, a man of authority and encyclopedic knowledge, often esteemed both within
and without the Conseil d'Etat. His task is to draw out the hidden implications, to
reflect upon the series of applicable precedents, and to lay out the bricks and straws
of a proposed decision. Again, this is done before the assembled section meeting
in public. Needless to say, it does not matter that the visible public is less than all
of Paris. It may consist, in fact, of no more than half a dozen individuals, including the inevitable old man who throughout the proceedings remains buried in
his newspaper, turning the pages with unseemly rustling. The self-discipline
emanating from a public proceeding is, nevertheless, present.
But there are still other roles in the review process that need to be sketched in.
An important role is played by the president of the section, also mostly a great name.
Although normally quietly attentive, he may have reason to invite clarification of
particular points. Nor do things necessarily end in the section. Whenever there
is need for it, especially in order to reconcile different views of different sections,
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a still larger forum is supplied in the form of a joint meeting of several sections or
of the plenary session of the entire membership of the Conseil d'Etat.
In the operation of this machinery, one perceives an acknowledgment of the
dimension of time. The Council, in pronouncing itself on what is law today, reaches
back to what it found to be law in the past. Where it encounters a fork in the road,
it also speculates about the likely requirements of the future. What is still more
important, in the process of committing itself, the Council searches cautiously for
the concert of minds in its midst. It strains to hear many voices rather than a single
melody.
Individual responsibility and group responsibility are intermingled without
stifling either. The tone of the proceedings is one of free inquiry, unburdened
by disproportionate considerations of protocol, seniority, or prestige. For an old
institution, this is cogent evidence of a youthful disposition, toward which Rene
Cassin, the young old man so long at the helm of the Council, has made a great
contribution. As a result of all these factors, what comes out of the Conseil d'Etat
can well be called an embodiment of collective energies. It is representative of the
spirit of the institution rather than of any one dominant mind.
Two additional points deserve mention. In the first place, despite the standing
they enjoy, members of the Conseil d'Etat do not have individual offices, nor even
working cubicles, a discomfort not as outrageous as it might appear to be to
Americans when it is recalled that members of the British House of Commons are

equally disadvantaged. Only the head of the Conseil d'Etat, designated as vice
president under a nominal presidency, has his own office. On the other hand, it is
obvious that for the same reason no staff member can hide within the institutional
body itself. He cannot withdraw from his colleagues, except by working at home.
When he is at the office, he does his work in the reasonably spacious library with
heavily loaded shelves.
It is here that professional consultation takes place in whispered conversations
that may go on for considerable time. It is here that ambiguities in legal clauses
and past decisions are sounded out and fine points of meaning are argued soberly.

With but slight exaggeration, one may say that the mind of the Conseil d'Etat is
being made up in the library. The principal means are an exchange of views among

colleagues and quiet study of the printed page, file materials, or some draft paragraphs, usually still handwritten. In a sense, the Council is engaged in a perpetual
conference.
Secondly, to stimulate among the membership of the Conseil d'Etat a comprehension of the many different questions coming up simultaneously before its several
sections, a system of documentation has been built up. Case summaries and section
agendas are prepared, which each member finds in his mail tray as he proceeds to
the library. In this manner, an institutional mirror is held before the entire staff.
Intellectual participation in what is going on at various points in the Palais Royal,
the Council's nobly creaky quarters, is thus encouraged. The men and women in
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the service of the Council see about them not the impassive hauteur of abstract
justice, but a breathing manifestation of law for all.
Here, then, is the vignette of a great administrative court. Perhaps its best
5 commemorating,
self-portrait can be found in the ornate Livre Jubilaire"
a decade
ago, the i5oth anniversary of the Council's postrevolutionary reincarnation. Napoleon
once said to one of his intimates that he never tired of taking his seat among the
members of the Conseil d'Etat, even immediately upon return from a theater of war,
because it was exciting to him to match his intelligence against the best minds of
France and to find himself scoring well. It is this intellectual heritage that has fitted
the Council for its historic mission as the molder of the law of administration and
as the watchdog over arbitrary power--even under the first empire, even under
PMain.
To keep administrative justice an intellectual force as well as an agency of order
and accountability has been recognized as a demand of necessity outside France as
well. In Germany, for example, the link between the academic profession and the
administrative courts has been a matter of tradition. The very concept of a specialized judiciary was picked up at an early date and carried forward toward practical
application by political scientists as well as by teachers of public law. Juridical
scholarship went far to open the terrain to the operations of administrative courts.
It scraped the basic concepts clean, converted rulings into rules, and proceeded to
erect a systematically arranged body of administrative law.
One beneficial effect was that the specialized judiciary was spared a great deal
of agonized groping. Another effect was that the developing law of administration,
though built up decision by decision, case by case, evolved a sense of inner coherence. It strove toward a grand design. In consequence, administrative law became greatly more teachable academically, thus progressively becoming more refinable. But the academic teacher was not only the instructor of his students.
He also taught the practitioners of the administrative arts when reaching outside
the lecture hall, especially as the author of treatises, monographs, and other professional writings. To a larger extent perhaps than most other fields of legal
knowledge, administrative law invited methodical exposition. The great texts tended
to be systems rather than compilations. They grouped the particulars and reached
for the whole.
The fact that here, for once, the national context was less relevant left its imprint,
too. Administrative law was a continental European common law, as it were.
Intellectual interchange was thus made vastly simpler. In this respect, the Dane
spoke the same language as the Argentinian, the Vietnamese the same as the Algerian. Many of the best-known works in the field reflected experience drawn from
different areas. The classic example, no doubt, is the treatment of Verwaltungsrecht
from the pen of Otto Mayer. Here was a man so endowed as to be unusually suc5
" LE CONSEIL D'ETAT,

LivaE J BMAIRE (1952).
The almost 700 closely-packed pages of this
volume also contain a substantial section devoted to the influence of droit administratif on other parts

of the world.
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cessful in forming a link between Germany and France. But Professor Mayer saw
more than a joint interest and an identical outlook upon the danger of untamed
power. He also recognized, earlier than others, that administrative law, in the day
of positive government, was bound to become the prime instrument of the industrial
society. After the first World War, when the political institutions of Europe had
been drastically revised by history, Mayer remarked with uncanny astuteness in
the introduction to the new edition of his book: "Constitutional law vanishes,
administrative law remains."'16
The German academic teacher, moreover, was not merely an organizer and an
intermediary of knowledge. He was also pulled directly into the work of the
administrative courts by combining the freedom of scholarship with service on the
bench. While being made to give, he was allowed to take. Theory had its feet
pulled down to the ground, and practice was not allowed to stagnate. Not all great
teachers are great judges, but judges benefit from intermittent seminars in
chambers. Tough thinking strengthens the sinews of justice.
This must suffice to delineate our subject. The institutional outline should be
clear. What needs to be added is that the clarifying effect of an outline stems
always in part from the bold strokes with which it is set forth. We have drawn a
type, in a sense. But such is the perversity of human nature that it never tires of
contradicting the typical. Hence, it is obvious that the type is continuously cut
into and thus distorted by innumerable individual actions running counter to it.
Moreover, to draw a type is not to claim perfection. As we said at the outset, each
institutional characteristic provokes its variants. Ultimate appraisal of what presents
itself as a type has to be in terms of varying degrees of the type's own self-fulfillment.
Granting all that, much is left to reflect upon. Culture patterns, it is true, do not
encourage transplantations. To compare contains no commitment toward exchange.
It does add a new brightness to the familiar. It may suggest a new direction in
which to advance reconnaissance. It may prompt a turn of mind.
6

: Orro MAYER, DEurscii.s VERwALTuNGSRECHT (1924).

